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The desirability bias, or wishful thinking, refers to the increased likelihood of predicting an 
outcome due to a preference for that outcome (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).  Research 
exploring the desirability bias has been limited to dichotomous decisions (e.g., will Team A 
or Team B win the game?), but many predictions involve more than two possible outcomes 
(e.g., will runner A, B, C, or D win the race?).  In this study, people were asked to make 
predictions about upcoming events.  Specifically, they were shown a multicolor grid of 
squares and were asked to predict which color they thought the computer would pick at 
random. Preference for one color versus the other was manipulated using desirable and 
undesirable point information.  Importantly, half of the participants made predictions when 
there were two possible outcomes (i.e., two different colors of squares in each grid) while the 
other half made predictions when there were four possible outcomes (i.e., four different 
square colors).  I found that, overall, participants were more likely to predict that desirable 
outcomes were more likely than undesirable outcomes—that is, they exhibited wishful 
thinking.  Furthermore, participants were as likely to make wishful predictions when there 
 
v 
 
were two possible outcomes versus when there were four possible outcomes, meaning that 
the desirability bias did not change as a function of the number of outcomes.  This finding 
extends previous wishful thinking findings by generalizing the results to situations where 
there are more than two outcomes.  
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Abstract 
The desirability bias, or wishful thinking, refers to the increased likelihood of 
predicting an outcome due to a preference for that outcome (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).  
Research exploring the desirability bias has been limited to dichotomous decisions (e.g., will 
Team A or Team B win the game?), but many predictions involve more than two possible 
outcomes (e.g., will runner A, B, C, or D win the race?).  In this study, people were asked to 
make predictions about upcoming events.  Specifically, they were shown a multicolor grid of 
squares and were asked to predict which color they thought the computer would pick at 
random. Preference for one color versus the other was manipulated using desirable and 
undesirable point information.  Importantly, half of the participants made predictions when 
there were two possible outcomes (i.e., two different colors of squares in each grid) while the 
other half made predictions when there were four possible outcomes (i.e., four different 
square colors).  I found that, overall, participants were more likely to predict that desirable 
outcomes were more likely than undesirable outcomes—that is, they exhibited wishful 
thinking.  Furthermore, participants were as likely to make wishful predictions when there 
were two possible outcomes versus when there were four possible outcomes, meaning that 
the desirability bias did not change as a function of the number of outcomes.  This finding 
extends previous wishful thinking findings by generalizing the results to situations where 
there are more than two outcomes.  
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The Desirability Bias Beyond Dichotomous Outcomes 
Making judgments and decisions are a normal part of everyday life.  Most of these 
decisions can be relatively inconsequential, like whether to schedule a campus tour at 2 P.M. 
or 4 P.M.  However, many decisions can have lasting consequences, like deciding to apply to 
a certain college based on the quality of that tour.  Optimal decision making is useful for long 
and short term success.  It would be difficult to make the best decision about which graduate 
programs to apply to if the person applying was unable to accurately judge his or her 
academic ability and subsequent likelihood of acceptance.  Although the ability to make 
informed judgments about events is important, there are many factors that may affect a 
person’s ability to accurately perceive an event.  For example, people’s predictions can be 
influenced by the amount of ambiguity surrounding details of the event (Bier & Connell, 
1994), loyalty to a group (Morewedge, Tang, & Larrick, 2018; Tang, Morewedge, Larrick, & 
Klein, 2017), the number and complexity of possible choices (Schwartz, 2004) and a 
preference for an outcome (Marks, 1951).  Understanding how factors influence the types of 
judgments people make can help predict success across the breadth of different decisions and 
judgments.  For decades researchers have investigated how preference may influence 
subsequent judgments (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007; Marks, 1951).  The desirability bias—or wishful thinking as it is also 
called— refers to the increased likelihood of predicting an outcome because of a preference 
for that outcome (for a review, see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).  Similarly, researchers have 
also investigated how the number of outcomes influences the decision-making process 
(Windschitl & Chambers, 2004; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Something that is currently 
missing from the described bodies of research is the ability to understand how preference for 
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an outcome changes as a function of the number of different possible outcomes, and what 
this can mean for biased decision making. 
The Desirability Bias 
The desirability bias occurs when a person’s expectation about the likelihood of an 
outcome is inflated by his or her desire for that outcome (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).  For 
example, the desirability bias provides one explanation for why a Carolina Panthers fan 
might be overly optimistic about the Panthers’ chances of winning an upcoming game.  There 
are, of course, numerous valid reasons for optimism; the Panthers might be particularly 
strong, their opponent might be particularly weak, or they are playing at the Panthers’ home 
field.  The desirability bias, however, asserts that the simple desire for the Panthers to win 
can increase people’s expectations about a victory independent of the evidential reasons for 
the expectation.  The desirability bias has been demonstrated across many different domains 
including political elections (Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010; Tappin, van der Leer, & McKay, 
2017), sporting events (Babad & Katz, 1991; Massey, Simmons, & Armor, 2011), and games 
of chance (Crandall, Solomon, & Kellaway, 1955; Irwin, 1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; 
Marks, 1951). 
Factors Affecting the Desirability Bias 
The desirability bias states that preference for an outcome can change a person’s 
expectation about that outcome, but there are a number of ways of asking a person to express 
his or her expectations.  For example, a Carolina Panthers fan might be asked how likely she 
thinks the Panthers are to win their upcoming game.  Or, the fan might be asked whether or 
not she thinks the Panthers will win.  Although the distinction between asking about the 
likelihood of the event or whether an event will happen might seem minor, it has been shown 
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to influence the magnitude of wishful thinking.  In an experimental test of the influence of 
judgment type on the desirability bias, Windschitl, Smith, Rose, and Krizan (2010) assigned 
participants to either make a likelihood judgement about a future event or to make an 
outcome prediction (e.g., X or Y).  They found that outcome predictions reliably led to more 
wishful thinking than likelihood judgments.  This may be because likelihood judgments are 
usually numerically based, and tend to ground people in the objective likelihood of the event 
(Windschitl et al., 2010).  When making an outcome prediction, people have more flexibility 
in how a conclusion is formed because it can accommodate different likelihood expectations.  
For example, if someone evaluates the relevant information and concludes that there is 
between a 40% and 60% chance that there will be sunshine (e.g., from weather channels, 
phone apps, or from looking outside), and she is then asked to predict the likelihood of 
sunshine, she is likely to say a percentage in the 40%-60% range.  However, if she is asked 
whether or not it will be sunny outside (an outcome prediction) she may be more likely to 
lean towards the upper bound of that judgment (60%) and predict the preferred sunny day.  If 
she knows that she wants to spend the day inside, and does not want the day to be sunny, she 
may be more likely to lean towards the lower bound of that judgment (40%) and predict a 
cloudy day.  For both decisions, the evaluated likelihoods did not vary depending on the 
desirability of the outcomes (i.e., they were both somewhere between 40%-60%).  However, 
the outcome predictions did vary as a function of the desirability of the outcomes.   
The precision of the information provided also influences the desirability bias (Smith, 
Smith, Windschitl, & Stuart, 2019).  In a recent set of studies, the precision of information 
given to participants regarding the possible outcomes was either relatively precise (e.g., there 
is a 60% chance the event will occur) or relatively imprecise (e.g., a visual representation of 
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the likelihood information).  In these studies, giving people more precise information 
increased the magnitude of the desirability bias.  It is speculated that this surprising 
“precision effect” may be due to differences in processing mindsets.  When information is 
precise and easy to process, people do not evaluate it as closely; when the information is 
imprecise and relatively difficult to process, they more thoroughly process (and use) the 
information. 
An important distinction is the difference between uncertainty and 
ambiguity/imprecision.  Namely, uncertainty refers to the variability in the possible 
outcomes, whereas ambiguity/imprecision refers to the lack of information about the 
likelihood of the possible outcomes.  For example, the chances of rolling an even number on 
a fair, 6-sided die would involve high uncertainty because there is an equal chance of the 
outcome being an odd number and an even number.  Although there is high uncertainty, the 
likelihood information is very unambiguous/precise because there is exactly a 50% chance 
that the die will land on an even number.  Research has shown that situations that are more 
uncertain yield greater degrees of wishful thinking (Krizan & Windschitl, 2009; Windschitl, 
et al., 2010). 
In many situations, the outcome of an event it relatively certain.  For example, when 
people play the lottery, most understand that they will almost certainly lose.  Even though 
winning is desirable, the certainty of the outcome limits the amount of wishful thinking that 
might occur.  Imagine someone predicting which card will be chosen from a deck containing 
either six black and four red cards, or nine black and one red card.  In the former, uncertainly 
is higher because there is more variability in the outcome.  In the latter, the participant can be 
fairly sure the chosen card was black.  The less certainty in a situation, the greater the chance 
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the individual will rely on guessing, which tends to lean towards the preferred option 
(Windschitl et al., 2010). 
The evidence suggests that the desirability bias can be moderated by the likelihood of 
the outcomes and the information about the likelihood of the outcome.  The next group of 
studies investigated if additional characteristics about the outcomes could diminish bias.  In 
an effort to determine if the desirability bias was simply “cheap talk”, researchers began 
giving incentives for accurate predictions.  In an experimental manipulation of accuracy 
incentives, Simmons and Massey (2012) promised football fans either $5 or $50 for the 
correct prediction of who would win an upcoming NFL game.  The incentive for predicting 
the correct outcome did not decrease the desirability bias.  This suggests that people truly 
believe in the predictions that they are making.   
In addition, Massey et al. (2011) examined whether the desirability bias could be 
moderated by feedback and experience.  In this study, participants were asked to make 
judgments about the winner of upcoming NFL games throughout a season.  Across the 17 
weeks, participants were informed of the winner and loser of each game.  Despite knowing 
the actual records of each team, participants were just as optimistic about their preferred team 
at the end of the season as they were for the first game.  This study shows that bias persists 
even when knowledge is improved.   
The desirability bias is the boost in expectations about an outcome when that outcome 
is preferred.  This review has described factors that do and do not influence the magnitude of 
the desirability bias.  Research has shown that while the prediction method and uncertainty of 
the outcome do moderate bias, accuracy incentives, experience, and feedback do not.  One 
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factor that has yet to be investigated is the influence of more than two outcomes on the 
presence and strength of bias. 
Beyond Dichotomous Judgments   
Thus far, all of the examples described have shown demonstrations of the desirability 
bias when there are two possible outcomes (e.g., black or red card, two competing sports 
teams, and a general election between two party leaders).  Research has yet to investigate if, 
and how, more than two outcomes affects the strength of the desirability bias. 
There are two noteworthy reasons why it is useful to understand differences in 
judgments when there are two or more possible outcomes.  First, it makes sense from a 
practical standpoint.  Many real-life decisions involve more than two outcomes.  Some of 
these situations can be low-cost, like people rooting for their own country versus the many 
other countries during the Olympics.  Some of these decisions can have varying degrees of 
cost, like deciding to bet on red versus black or one of the 38 numbers during a round of 
roulette.  And, some decisions can have lasting and consequential costs, like a home-owner 
deciding to evacuate based on where a hurricane is likely to hit (e.g., the east coast of North 
Carolina versus each individual city on the east coast of North Carolina).  Understanding 
how a person perceives the former (two outcomes) versus the latter (more than two 
outcomes) can help inform policy makers, forecasters, and researchers about how people 
understand numerical information and probabilities as the number of possible 
choices/outcomes change.    
Second, not only is it important to understand judgments with more than two 
outcomes in a real-world application, but people tend to engage in non-normative behaviors 
when more than two outcomes are present.  Research has suggested that people have 
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difficulty making a decision when they are overwhelmed by the number of options 
(Schwartz, 2004).  Commonly referred to as ‘overchoice,’ this phenomenon describes the 
inability to make a decision when there are too many choices, often used in the case of 
consumer decision-making.  Overchoice can refer to the number of options, like choosing a 
cellular service provider between all options or narrowing it down to a top two.  
Alternatively, overchoice can reference the complexity of the options (e.g., choosing a 
cellular service provider based on price, or choosing a cellular service provider based on 
price, data packages, national coverage, brand recognition, loyalty, and reviews).  The 
complexity of each option may force a person to rely more on alternative factors like 
availability and preference.  Overchoice may lead to less optimal decision-making because of 
decision fatigue, and may make the person choose the default option, or avoid making a 
decision at all (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000).   
In the case of overchoice, people tend to have a difficult time making a decision as 
the number and complexity of the options increase.  However, in the case of overchoice, it 
may be difficult to standardize the weight of each of the alternatives because of subjective 
preference for certain characteristics versus others.  In addition, it would be extremely 
difficult to quantify features that can influence decisions (i.e., intuitive brand preference and 
recognition about cell phone providers).  The next body of research remedies this issue by 
assigning numerical weights and providing likelihood information about the possible 
outcomes.  
The alternative outcomes effect describes the change in the subjective likelihood of 
the focal outcome as the distribution of the alternative outcomes change (Windschitl & Wells, 
1998).  In one demonstration of this effect, Windschitl and Wells (1998) told participants that 
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they would be given 21 raffle tickets for a monetary prize (focal outcome).  In addition, the 
participants were told that there were five other people participating in the raffle, each with a 
certain number of raffle tickets (alternative outcomes).  In one condition, the participant was 
told that the five competing people held 14, 13, 15, 12, and 13 tickets.  In the second 
condition, the five people held 52, 6, 2, 2, and 5 tickets.  The participants were asked how 
certain they were that their raffle ticket would be chosen on an 11-point verbal scale of 
certainty (i.e., 0 = impossible to 10 = certain).1 Two important aspects to note: first, in both 
conditions the participant making the judgment has 21 raffle tickets.  Second, the total 
number of raffle tickets available (i.e., 81) is the same across conditions.  The objective 
probability of the participant winning both raffles remains the same (i.e., 21/81).  Analyses 
revealed that participants were significantly more certain of their raffle ticket being chosen in 
the first condition (21-14-13-15-12-13) compared to the second (21-52-6-2-2-5).  This effect 
is thought to occur because people typically do not calculate the objective likelihood of an 
event occurring when there are more than two outcomes.  Instead, they engage in pairwise 
comparisons by comparing the focal event (in this case, the participant winning the raffle) to 
each alternative outcome in turn.  In the first condition (21-14-13-15-12-13) the focal 
outcome compares relatively favorably to all of the alternatives.  In the second condition (21-
52-6-2-2-5) the focal outcome does not compare favorably to the first alternative, but 
compares relatively favorably in the remaining four alternatives.  In the first raffle, there are 
five favorable comparisons, and in the second raffle there are only four.  Therefore, people 
tend to be more confident they will win the first raffle as compared to the second. 
Ideally, a decision-maker should lower his or her expectation about the likelihood of 
an event as more options are added.  My probability estimate of the occurrence of one 
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number in a ten-sided die should be lower than for a six-sided die.  Although people typically 
understand this basic rule of probability theory, there are times where this rule is violated.  In 
a study examining the influence of adding low-probability outcomes to a set, Windschitl and 
Chambers (2004) asked participants to judge the likelihood of winning a number of different 
raffles.  In the first raffle (the baseline version), the participant held 39 tickets and the 
competitor held 31 tickets.  The second raffle introduced “duds” (dud-present version), 
meaning that the participant held 39 tickets, and of three competitors, one held 31 tickets, one 
held 2 tickets, and one held 3 tickets.  Objectively, the chances of winning the first raffle are 
greater than the second (i.e., 39/70 versus 39/75).  However, participants judged the 
likelihood of winning the second raffle as significantly higher than the first raffle.  The 
explanation for this dud-alternative effect, like the alternative outcomes effect described 
above, relies on the fact that participants often engage in pairwise comparisons.  In the 
baseline version (39-31) the focal outcome compares somewhat favorably against the 
alternative.  In the dud-present version (39-31-2-3), the focal outcome compares somewhat 
favorably against the first alternative, but very favorably against the second and third 
alternatives.  These latter two comparisons increase people’s confidence when duds are 
present, although this violates the objective probability that the focal event will occur. 
What is clear from the studies described above is that people do not always evaluate 
the likelihood of an event accurately or objectively, especially when there are more than two 
possible outcomes.  Because the decisions made are not based solely on probability, people 
must be using a non-normative strategy to structure their judgments.  There are a number of 
strategies a person might use to evaluate the likelihood of a particular event.  Imagine, for 
example, that John is tasked with predicting whether or not he will win an upcoming raffle.  
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John is told that he holds 13 raffle tickets.  He is also told that Susan holds 10 tickets, Marcus 
holds 4 tickets, and Jennifer holds 3 tickets.  Using a normative strategy, John would count 
up the number of tickets he holds (13) and divide by the total number of tickets (30) to 
calculate his objective likelihood.  As mentioned earlier, an alternative (and empirically 
supported) strategy is to make pairwise comparisons by evaluating his chances as compared 
to all of his competitors—Susan (13 versus 10), Marcus (13 versus 4), and Jennifer (13 
versus 3).  Finally, he might use a “number of options” strategy and simply focus on the fact 
that there are four possible outcomes (i.e., four possible people who can win the raffle) and 
he is one of those four.  The most important takeaway is that expectations about the 
likelihood of an outcome can change depending on the strategy a person uses.   
Furthermore, people may use different strategies to solve problems.  Although using a 
likelihood strategy is the most normative, it can sometimes be the most cognitively taxing.  
Someone with a worse understanding of numbers and probabilities may have a difficult time 
evaluating their chances as the likelihood information becomes more complex (Cokely, 
Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Cokely, Ghazal, Galesic, Garcia-
Retamero, & Schulz, 2013; Cokely, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Newall, 2016; Reyna, 
Nelson, Han, & Dieckman, 2009; Steen, 1990).   Alternatively, using a ‘number of options’ 
approach would be the least cognitively taxing because the decision-maker is ignoring the 
provided numerical information.  Using a pairwise comparison approach may be a happy 
medium between these approaches, such that people pay attention to the likelihood 
information, but use it in a way to simplify the prediction.  Most importantly, the type of 
strategy a person uses may change as a function of their motivation to come to a certain 
conclusion (Kunda, 1990).   
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Current Study 
First, people tend to expect and predict a certain outcome when they have a 
preference for that outcome (i.e., a desirability bias; Marks, 1951; for a review, see Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007).  Second, people’s subjective understanding of the likelihood information 
can change depending on how the possible outcomes are structured (Windschitl & Chambers, 
2004; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  Last, motivation may inform how these two processes 
interact to influence the bias and accuracy in upcoming predictions (Kunda, 1990).  Is 
decision-making strategy firm throughout a task, or is decision strategy flexible and can 
change depending on an individual’s case by case motivation to conclude a certain outcome?   
The current study investigated the relationship between the number of outcomes and 
the desirability bias.  Desirability bias research is clear, but it lacks the incorporation of more 
than two outcomes.  Research investigating the distribution of the possible outcomes has 
illustrated the non-normative nature of decision making when the number of outcomes 
increase or the distribution of the outcomes change.  The proposed study will bridge the gap 
in research by investigating both the desirability bias and the number of outcomes.   
In this study, participants predicted the outcome of uncertain events.  Specifically, 
they were shown a grid of 300 colored squares and asked to predict which color the computer 
would choose at random.  The objective likelihood of the colors was displayed through the 
frequency of the colors of the squares.  That is, people had a sense of the distribution but did 
not know the exact proportions.  Some of the grids had two colors, meaning there are two 
possible outcomes (dichotomous condition) and some of the grids had four colors meaning 
there are four possible outcomes (polychotomous condition).  Desirability was manipulated 
by associating some colors with winning points and some with losing points.   
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My first prediction was that participants would be sensitive to the proportions of each 
of the colors.  Specifically, the participants would be more likely to predict the color 
associated with a higher frequency of squares.  Second, there would be evidence of a 
desirability bias; people would be more likely to predict a color when it is desirable (i.e., 
associated with winning points) than when it is undesirable (i.e., associated with losing 
points).  Third, that there would be a greater desirability bias in situations that are more 
uncertain.  Specifically, people would be more likely to predict the desirable versus 
undesirable color when there are 50% versus 25% or 75% of the squares present.  This is 
consistent with past research demonstrating a stronger desirability bias with greater 
uncertainty (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Windschitl, et al., 2010).  The fourth and final 
prediction investigated the novel demonstration of both the desirability bias and the 
alternative outcomes effect.  I predicted that the desirability bias would be stronger for those 
in the polychotomous condition compared to the dichotomous condition.  The rationale for 
this prediction is that there are more strategies available to people when making predictions 
about events with more than two outcomes (with dichotomous outcomes, a normative 
strategy and pairwise comparison strategy lead to the same conclusions).  This added 
flexibility when evaluating polychotomous outcomes may increase the influence of desire on 
people’s predictions.   
Method 
This study was preregistered and all materials, data, and syntax are posted on the 
Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/m9sjv/).  Furthermore, I report how I determined the 
sample size, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. 
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Participants 
 Based on pilot testing and previous demonstrations of this paradigm, I had a target 
sample size of 200 participants (i.e., 100 per between subjects condition).  I was able to 
recruit 230 (86.1% Female, Mage = 19.19, SDage = 1.43) participants through the Appalachian 
State University Psychology Subject Pool.  The Psychology Subject Pool consists of students 
enrolled in introductory and intermediate Psychology classes who have elected to enter the 
Psychology Subject Pool to fulfill an Experiential Learning Credit (ELC) for the course.  In 
addition, participants were given candy for their involvement.  Based on the average 
correlation between repeated measures (r = .395) and a sample size of 230, a sensitivity 
power analysis indicated a 90% chance of detecting a small-moderate effect (Cohen’s d = 
0.36) for the critical Outcomes X Desirability interaction (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009).  Appalachian State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined this 
study to be exempt from IRB oversight (see Appendix A).   
Design 
The study used a 2 (desirability condition: critical color is desirable vs. critical color 
is not desirable) x 5 (percentages condition: 25%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 75%) x 2 (outcome 
condition: dichotomous outcomes vs. polychotomous outcomes) mixed measures design.  
The outcome condition was manipulated between-subjects, while the percentages condition 
and desirability condition were manipulated within-subjects.   
Procedure 
Each participant who met the age and subject pool requirements (18+ and enrolled in 
an Appalachian State University Psychology course) was invited to take part in the study.  
After arriving to the lab, the participants were given an informed consent document (see 
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Appendix B) that briefly stated the purpose of the research study, the risks, an explanation 
that participation is voluntary, and the contact information of the Principal Investigator.  
Participants were also informed that participation will take no more than 30 minutes, and will 
satisfy 1 ELC requirement.  After reading the consent form, participants were given the 
chance to ask any questions.  Once answered, participants were instructed to complete the 
rest of the study on the provided computers.   
The participants read instructions about their task.  Specifically, they were informed 
that their task is to predict which color the computer will pick at random from a grid of 300 
colored squares.  Instructions explained that the participant’s prediction will in no way 
influence which color the computer picks.  Before making their prediction, participants 
received two pieces of information: (1) the desirability point information and (2) the grid 
information.  First, desirability point information informed the participants that one color is 
associated with either winning or losing points.  In this thesis, this color was referred to as 
the “critical color.”  For example, a participant might be told that if the computer randomly 
picks a red square, they will win 100 points.  The other colors present were not associated 
with either winning or losing points (i.e., winning/losing 0 points).  This information was 
available for six seconds.  Second, the desirability point information remained on the screen 
and the grid of 300 colored squares appeared.  Participants assigned to the dichotomous 
outcome condition were shown a grid with two colors and participants assigned to the 
polychotomous outcome condition were shown a grid with four colors (see Figure 1 for a 
visual representation of the desirability and grid information).  For both outcome conditions, 
the choice is between the critical color and the non-critical color(s).  The experimental 
program is designed so that for the dichotomous condition, the computer will choose two 
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colors from a bank of four different four-color combinations.  The four-color combinations 
were used for the polychotomous condition.  This assures that participants in both outcome 
conditions will view similar color combinations.  The grid and point information were shown 
for six seconds.  The grid and point information then disappeared, and the participants were 
shown a decision screen where they were asked to predict if the computer would choose the 
critical color or the non-critical color(s).  For the dichotomous condition, participants will 
predict one of the two colors (i.e., the critical or the non-critical color).  For the 
polychotomous condition, the three remaining non-critical colors were consolidated into one 
option, meaning they will predict between the critical color and all three non-critical colors, 
essentially making a dichotomous decision.  For a visual representation of the outcome 
prediction, see Figure 2.  Participants were not given feedback as to whether or not their 
prediction matched what the computer actually picked.  After a practice trial where the 
program explains each step of the experiment, the participants were free to begin.   
The participants had the opportunity to win points in one of two ways.  First, they can 
win points if the computer chooses the critical color on a round where the critical color is 
associated with winning points (they will lose 100 points if for that round the critical color is 
associated with losing points).  Point allocation is independent of the participant’s prediction 
(i.e., if the critical color was associated with losing points, and the participant predicted the 
non-critical color, if the computer chose the critical color, they would still lose 100 points 
despite their prediction).  Second, they can win 25 points if they make an accurate prediction 
(i.e., predicting the same color the computer chooses).  Participants were told that more 
points indicated a greater candy prize at the end of the study. 
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Across each round, two features of the grid changed.  First, for half the rounds, the 
critical color was associated with winning 100 points (making that outcome more desirable) 
and for the other half the rounds, the critical color was associated with losing 100 points 
(making that outcome less desirable).  Second, the percentage of the critical color was 
randomized across each trial.  The possible percentages include 25%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 
75%.2 For the dichotomous condition, the second color will comprise the remainder of the 
squares (e.g., if the percentage of the critical color is 25%, the percentage of the non-critical 
color is 75%).  For the polychotomous condition, the probability of the critical color was 
identical to its dichotomous counterpart.  The only difference is that the three non-critical 
colors comprised the remainder of the squares equally.  For example, if the percentage of the 
critical color is 25%, the percentage of the three non-critical colors would be 25% each, 
totaling 75%.    
  There are two different desirability conditions (desirable and undesirable) and five 
different percentage conditions (25%, 40%, 50%, 60%, and 75%).  Therefore, there were 10 
possible combinations of the within-subjects desirability and percentages conditions.   The 
order of these 10 combinations were randomized within two blocks of 10 rounds each—for a 
total of 20 rounds. 
 After completing the 20 rounds, participants completed individual difference 
measures (i.e., Life Orientation Test – Revised, Rational Experiential Inventory – 40, and the 
Abbreviated Numeracy Scale), answered demographic questions (i.e., age and gender), 
debriefed, credited for their participation in the study, and asked to leave. 
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Exploratory Measures 
In addition to the prediction task (described in the Procedure section), participants 
completed three exploratory individual difference measures. 
Life orientation test – revised.  The Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R) was 
developed to assess variability in generalized optimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994).  
It is a 10-item scale consisting of six questions assessing optimism/pessimism, and four filler 
items.  The scoring criteria is based on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 = I disagree a lot, 2 = I 
disagree a little, 3 = I neither agree nor disagree, 4 = I agree a little, and 5 = I agree a lot.  
The LOT-R is the revised version of the Life Orientation Test (LOT) which contained 12 
items (Scheier & Carver, 1992).  Higher scores on the LOT-R indicate higher levels of global 
optimism.  Analyses of validity assessed the unidimensional pessimism-optimism spectrum 
using item response theory (IRT) and found that the LOT-R satisfactorily measured the latent 
trait of dispositional optimism (Chiesi, Galli, Primi, Borgi, & Bonacchi, 2013).  In addition, 
several studies have confirmed the reliability and validity of the LOT-R using measures of 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability, construct and predictive validity, and 
significant correlations to psychological well-being, sense of mastery, and sense of coherence 
(for a review, Carver, Scheier, Miller, & Fulford, 2009).  For a document detailing the 
instructions, questions, and reverse-scored items, see Appendix C. 
Rational experiential inventory.  The Rational Experiential Inventory – 40 (REI-40) 
is used to measure preferences for information processing (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  The 
REI-40 distinguishes between two different processing methods: Need for Cognition (NFC) 
which is characterized as a rational style and emphasizes a logical and analytical approach, 
and Faith in Intuition (FI) which is characterized as an experiential style and emphasizes a 
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pre-conscious, affective, holistic approach.  The REI-40 is a 40-item scale with four 
subscales, two for each of the two processing styles, with each subscale containing 10 
questions.  The four subscales include rational ability (RA), rational engagement (RE), 
experiential ability (EA), and experiential engagement (EE).  The questions for each subscale 
include items regarding the ability to think logically, enjoyment of thinking logically, ability 
to respect one’s intuitive feelings, and the enjoyment of relying on this intuition, respectively.  
The 40 items are scored using 5-point ratings from 1 (definitely not true of myself) to 5 
(definitely true of myself).  The REI-40 was investigated using confirmatory factor analysis 
(Björklund & Bäckström, 2008).  Analysis confirmed the hypothesized model and indicated 
that experientiality and rationality were orthogonal traits, and that adequate correlations with 
other personality traits were reached in order to determine acceptable convergent and 
discriminant validity.  For a document detailing the given instructions questions, and reverse-
scored items, see Appendix D. 
Abbreviated numeracy scale.  Numeracy refers to the ability to use mathematics and 
statistics in everyday life.  In other words, someone’s numerical “literacy” (National 
Numeracy, 2014).  Being numerate means being able to reason with numbers in a way that 
extends beyond an academic setting, and to incorporate numerical reasoning in new, 
everyday problems.  In general, numerate people have the ability to: interpret data and 
graphs, process information, solve problems, check answers, understand and explain 
solutions, and make decisions based on logical thinking.  Those higher in numeracy have 
been shown to have superior skills in evaluating medical treatment options and risk, political 
information, and financial products and investments (Cokely et al., 2012; Cokely et al., 2013; 
Cokely et al., 2014; Newall, 2016; Reyna et al., 2009; Steen, 1990).  Numeracy may refer to 
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both mathematical and statistical numeracy.  Statistical numeracy describes real-world 
reasoning with numerical problems whereas mathematical numeracy describes the ability to 
visualize and understand graphical or numerical displays of information (Cokely et al., 
2018).  Statistical numeracy, or practical probabilistic reasoning has the unique ability to 
predict decision-making in naturalistic, real-world choices such as HIV prevention, 
cardiovascular risk, medical judgments, policy evaluations, and weather vulnerability 
(Cokely et al., 2014).  In addition, numeracy can also predict resistance to theoretical and 
logical decision-making errors such as framing effects, sunk costs, inconsistent risk 
evaluation, overconfidence, and norming (among others; Cokely et al., 2014). 
The abbreviated numeracy scale (ANS) was developed to assess numeracy (Weller et 
al., 2013).  The ANS is an 8-item scale that consists of eight different numerical and word 
problems for the participant to solve.  The ANS is superior to other numeracy measures (e.g., 
the Berlin Numeracy Test; Cokely et al. 2012) because of its broader range of difficulty, 
generalizability, and prediction of decision-making and risk behavior (Weller et al., 2013).  
The scoring criteria is dichotomous, meaning that the participant either gets the answer 
correct or incorrect.  Higher scores on the ANS indicate higher levels of numeracy.  This 
scale was chosen because of the probabilistic nature of the experimental paradigm.  For a 
document detailing the questions and answers of the ANS, see Appendix E. 
Results 
Confirmatory Analyses 
For each participant, the number of times he or she predicted that the computer would 
pick the critical color was measured.  The critical color is the color associated with either 
winning or losing points.  Next, I conducted a 2 (outcome: dichotomous vs. polychotomous) 
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x 5 (percentages: 25%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 75%) x 2 (desirability: critical color is desirable 
[winning 100 points] vs. the critical color is not desirable [losing 100 points]) mixed ANOVA 
on the number of times people predicted the critical color.  The outcome condition was 
manipulated between-subjects while percentages and desirability were manipulated within-
subjects.   
There was a significant desirability bias, F(1, 228) = 147.66, p < .001, ɳp2 = .393.  
Participants were more likely to predict that the computer would choose the critical color if it 
was associated with winning points (66%) rather than losing points (41%).  There was also a 
main effect of percentages, F(4, 912) = 289.59, p < .001, ɳp2 = .559.  As the proportion of the 
critical color increased, participants were more likely to predict that the computer would 
randomly select that critical color.  And, in line with the previously-discussed findings from 
the relationship between uncertainty and desirability (Windschitl et al., 2010), there was an 
interaction between desirability and percentages, F(4, 912) = 8.53, p < .001, ɳp2 = .036.  
Participants exhibited a greater desirability bias when more uncertainty was present (when 
the color proportions were 50/50) and less of a desirability bias when less uncertainty was 
present (e.g., when the proportions were 25/75). 
Interestingly, there was a main effect of number of outcomes, F(1, 228) = 7.26,          
p = .008, ɳp2 = .031.  Participants were slightly more likely to predict the critical color in the 
polychotomous condition (55.0%) compared to the dichotomous condition (51.4%; see 
Figure 3).   
 As a test of the novel hypothesis that there would be a larger desirability bias in the 
polychotomous condition than the dichotomous condition, I examined the interaction 
between desirability and number of outcomes.  This interaction was not significant,          
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F(1, 228) = 0.07, p = .794, ɳp2 < .001.  This means that my hypothesis was not supported and 
people were equally biased in both outcome conditions.  In other words, there was not a 
greater desirability bias in the polychotomous condition compared to the dichotomous 
condition (see Figure 4). 
Finally, the Percentages X Outcomes interaction was not significant,                      
F(4, 912) = 2.21, p = .068, ɳp2 = .010, and the Desirability X Percentages X Outcomes 
interaction was not significant, F(4, 912) = 1.83, p = .122, ɳp2 = .008. 
In sum, the key result from the study was that, although there was a significant 
desirability bias, this bias was not moderated by the number of outcomes.   
Exploratory Analyses 
Accuracy in predictions.  For each participant, I measured the number of times he or 
she predicted the color associated with the greater proportion of squares—i.e., made the 
optimal prediction.  For example, regardless of whether a particular color was desirable or 
undesirable, predicting the color with 60% of the squares in the grid would be the optimal 
prediction.  The 50% percentage condition was omitted from the optimal prediction 
calculation because no prediction is better or worse than the other (i.e., both option is equally 
likely).  Next, I conducted a 2 (outcome: dichotomous vs. polychotomous) x 4 (percentages: 
25%, 40%, 60%, 75%) x 2 (desirability: critical color is desirable [winning 100 points] vs. 
the critical color is not desirable [losing 100 points]) mixed ANOVA on the number of times 
people predicted the optimal color.  The outcome condition was manipulated between-
subjects while percentages and desirability were manipulated within-subjects.  Analyses 
revealed a main effect of percentages F(3, 684) = 36.70, p < .001, ɳp2 = .139, such that for 
the 40% percentages condition, participants made the fewest optimal decisions (M = 66.2%) 
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compared to the 25% condition (M = 80.4%), 60% condition (M = 74.2%), and the 75% 
condition (M = 83.8%).  All mean differences were significant at the p < .05 level.  See 
Figure 5 for a graph representing the optimal decision analyses. 
There was a Desirability X Outcomes interaction, F(1, 228) = 5.20, p = .024,           
ɳp2 = .022.  Specifically, when the critical color was undesirable, participants in both the 
dichotomous (M = 76.4%) and polychotomous (M = 76.6%) conditions made a relatively 
equal number of optimal decisions.  However, when the critical color was desirable, those in 
the dichotomous condition (M = 78.3%) made more optimal decisions than those in the 
polychotomous condition (M = 73.3%).  There was also a Percentages X Outcomes 
interaction, F(3, 684) = 6.36, p < .001, ɳp2 = .027, such that for the 25%, 60%, and 75% 
percentages conditions, optimal decision making for both outcome conditions was relatively 
equal.  The only significant mean difference was between the two outcome conditions in the 
40% percentages condition.  Those in the dichotomous outcome condition (M = 72.1%) made 
significantly more optimal decisions in the 40% grid compared to the polychotomous 
outcome condition (M = 60.3%).  Finally, there was a Desirability X Percentages interaction, 
F(3, 684) = 70.47, p < .001, ɳp2 = .236, such that when the critical color was desirable, 
participants made more optimal decisions in the 60% and 75% conditions, and when the 
critical color was undesirable, participants made more optimal decisions in the 25% and 40% 
conditions.   
There was no main effect of desirability, F(1, 228) = 0.40, p = .530, ɳp2 = .002 or 
number of outcomes F(1, 228) = 1.23, p = .268, ɳp2 = .005.  There was also no Desirability X 
Percentages X Outcomes interaction, F(3, 684) = 0.49, p = .692, ɳp2 = .002. 
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Overall, people made better decisions when the outcome was more certain.  For 
undesirable outcomes and all grids besides the 40% (i.e., 25%, 60%, 75%), outcome 
condition did not affect decision making.  However, for desirable outcomes and for the 40% 
grid, decision making was worse for those in the polychotomous compared to the 
dichotomous condition.   
 Individual differences.  Although not a main concern of the thesis, I was interested 
in how certain individual differences may relate to each other.  For each participant, I 
calculated a “wishful thinking index.” This was calculated by subtracting the percentage of 
times the participant predicted the computer would pick the undesirable color from the 
percentage of times the participant predicted the desirable color.  Higher numbers indicated a 
greater degree of wishful thinking.  Wishful thinking indexes could range from -1 (predicted 
the undesirable color every time) to 1 (predicted the desirable color every time).  I also 
created an “optimal decisions index” which measured the proportion of times the participant 
predicted the “optimal color”.  Optimal indexes could range from 0 (never predicted the 
optimal color) to 1 (predicted the optimal color every time).  My exploratory analyses 
investigated correlations using the wishful thinking index, the optimal decisions index, the 
Abbreviated Numeracy Scale, the Rational-Experiential Inventory (i.e., Rational Ability, 
Rational Engagement, Experiential Ability, and Experiential Engagement), the Life-
Orientation Test (i.e., global optimism), gender, and age.    
In order to assess relative associations between individual differences I ran bivariate 
correlations between the main variables of interest (i.e., wishful thinking, numeracy, and 
optimal decision making).  A correlation table detailing all of the bivariate correlations 
between individual differences can be found in Table 1.  While interesting, variables that 
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were not significantly related to task-generated indices (i.e., the wishful thinking index and 
the optimal decisions index) are not discussed in detail.   
Wishful thinking was negatively related to optimal decision making, r(228) = -.37,    
p < .001, and numeracy r(228) = -.13, p = .044.  In addition, numeracy and optimal decision 
making were positively related r(228) = .22, p < .001.  These associations have important 
implications.  First, they suggest that there are consequences to engaging in a preference-
based bias, evidenced by the lower number of optimal predictions.  In addition, it offers some 
insight into why people may be more biased by their preferences.  The negative relationship 
between numeracy and wishful thinking suggests that it may be an issue with mathematical 
and statistical literacy and the inability to accurately judge probabilities and likelihood 
information.  This decreased ability to understand numerical information may lead people to 
rely more on other factors.  Other factors in this case include a preference for one outcome 
over others.  It is also possible, of course, that a third variable accounts for the relationship 
between wishful thinking and numeracy. 
Discussion 
 This study investigated how the number of possible outcomes influences the 
desirability bias.  As noted earlier, the central hypothesis to this thesis—that the increase in 
the number of outcomes would increase the desirability bias—was not supported.  
Participants were as likely to make preference-based biased decisions in the two and four 
color grid paradigm.  Although my hypothesis was not supported, it is worth noting that 
participants’ sensitivity to the proportion of the colors indicated that they understood the task.  
Participants were also more likely to predict the desirable color, indicating that they exhibited 
a desirability bias.  Finally, this desirability bias was moderated by the proportion of colors, 
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such that bias was the greatest when the outcome was more uncertain.  These three findings 
are consistent with previous research on wishful thinking (for a review see Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007).  
Implications 
 Confirmatory analyses.  First the results of my study increase the generalizability 
for desirability bias research.  As discussed in the introduction, I am aware of no research 
investigating the desirability bias where the paradigm compares decisions where there are 
more than two outcomes.  The lack of research in preference-based decision making could 
have had serious costs if predictions changed as a function of the number and distribution of 
the outcomes.  There have been numerous studies investigating wishful thinking in political 
elections (Krizan et al., 2010; Tappin et al., 2017).  All of these studies asked people to make 
predictions about the general election, but political decision making can extend far beyond 
this.  Think of presidential primaries, where the number and strength of potential party 
candidates can change day to day.  When aiming to make accurate forecasts about potential 
front-runners, what if voter prediction strategy changed as frequently as the makeup of the 
potential candidates? This thesis shows that the influence of desire on expectations about the 
outcomes is likely to be similar when there are two versus many possible outcomes.   
Second, the increase in generalizability helps contextualize past research, and also 
allows future researchers to continue to use paradigms with two outcomes without concern 
that the number of outcomes may change the results.  If, for example, the number of 
outcomes moderated wishful thinking, research using only two outcomes would be limited.  
Now, it is known that the number of outcomes likely does not influence wishful thinking.  
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Therefore, future research can use existing paradigms without fear of only capturing one 
aspect of wishful thinking. 
 The findings of my study also show support for the alternative outcomes effect.  
Participants in the four-outcome grid were overall more likely to predict the critical color 
than participants in the two-outcome grid.  If the participants were more likely to predict the 
color when there were more outcomes, it could be because they perceived that color to be 
more likely than it actually was.  This is in line with previous research where researchers 
found a boost in confidence, expectations, and predictions about a focal outcome when the 
number of outcomes increased (Windschitl & Chambers, 2004; Windschitl & Wells, 1998).  
This finding provides additional support that when there are more outcomes, people engage 
in non-normative prediction strategies.  On one hand, if participants were using a likelihood 
strategy, those who saw the two color grid would predict the critical color just as often as 
those in the four color grid condition because the percentage of the focal outcome was held 
constant across outcome conditions.  On the other hand, if participants were using a pairwise 
strategy, people who saw the two color grid would predict the critical color less often as 
compared to the four color grid condition. This would happen because of the artificial 
inflation of the critical color’s likelihood when the alternatives are considered separately 
(e.g., making a prediction about a 40/60 grid compared to a 40/20/20/20 grid).  Because the 
number of predictions was higher for those in the four outcome condition, it seems likely that 
people were using a pairwise strategy when predicting the color the computer would pick. 
This study found that the number of outcomes did not influence the amount of 
wishful thinking.  It is possible, of course, that there were features specific to this study that 
contributed to this finding.  For example, figuring out the likelihood of the outcomes is 
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relatively easy because of the grids that were used.  Also, for the polychotomous grid, all of 
the non-critical colors are grouped.  Such that for the point information, the grid information, 
and the outcome prediction, the three non-critical colors were right on top of each other, and 
the participant was making a prediction between the critical color and all of the non-critical 
colors together. Subsequently, this was a relatively easy task that did not involve a lot of 
ambiguity or numerical reasoning.  If the task was more difficult (e.g., the alternatives were 
not organized to make relevant comparisons easier) then I might have found different results.  
Finally, there was a huge effect of wishful thinking (ɳp2 = .393) in both outcome 
conditions.  Because of this, it is possible that there were ceiling effects.  Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that there would be more wishful thinking in the polychotomous condition, 
meaning that in the desirable conditions, participants would be more likely to predict the 
desirable color (and conversely less likely to predict the undesirable color).  But, if there was 
already a large wishful thinking effect in the dichotomous condition, it is unlikely that this 
specific task could identify an increase in bias.  Future demonstrations could experiment with 
different ways of asking for predictions.  Research has shown that the desirability bias tends 
to be elusive when the individual is asked to make a likelihood judgments about the 
outcomes.  Maybe, it is not there is no difference in bias between the outcomes, but the way 
the prediction was measured left no room to detect a difference. 
Exploratory analyses.  The exploratory analyses revealed interesting patterns in 
regards to optimal decision making.  First, the effect of percentages indicates that participants 
were better at making optimal decisions when there was greater certainty.  That is, 
participants made better decisions when there were either 25% or 75% critical squares versus 
the less certain 40% and 60%.  The more uncertain percentage conditions can allow for more 
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flexibility in the prediction because the “correct” answer is less clear.  When the provided 
proportions can reasonably go in either direction when the outcome is more uncertain, people 
might feel freer to make a guess-like prediction that is consistent with what they desire, 
which may lead to sub-optimal decision making. 
 Although the degree of a desirability bias was equal across outcome conditions, the 
number of optimal decisions was not.  When the optimal color was undesirable, those in both 
outcome conditions made a relatively equal amount of optimal decisions.  However, when 
the critical color was desirable, those in the polychotomous conditions made worse decisions.  
Follow up analyses indicated that the biggest discrepancy in optimal decisions was in the 
40% polychotomous grid.  Confirmatory analyses revealed that this was not necessarily due 
to an increase or decrease in wishful thinking, but may be due to the overall greater 
likelihood of those in the polychotomous condition predicting the critical color, especially in 
the 40% condition.  What is it about the 40% grid that elicits the biggest differences between 
the outcome conditions? Previously in this thesis, I described how when there are more than 
two outcomes, people tend to make pairwise comparisons between the focal outcome and 
each of the alternatives.  Of course, when there are only two outcomes people can certainly 
still make pairwise comparisons, but these judgments would not differ from an objective 
likelihood approach.  Illustrated in Figure 6, the 40% condition is the only grid where two of 
the proposed decision strategies (i.e., objective likelihood and pairwise comparisons) would 
yield different predictions.  For example, in the 60% outcome condition, those in the 
dichotomous condition would compare a focal 60% to an alternative 40%.  Conversely, those 
in the polychotomous condition would compare a focal 60% to alternatives 13.33%, 13.33%, 
and 13.33%.  For both outcome conditions, the “most likely” color would be the critical 
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color.  Therefore, whether people use a pairwise or likelihood strategy, they will make the 
same prediction.  However, for the 40% condition, those in the dichotomous condition would 
compare a focal 40% to an alternative 60%, and those in the polychotomous condition would 
compare a focal 40% to alternatives 20%, 20%, and 20%.  If people use a pairwise strategy in 
this condition, the “most likely” color in the dichotomous condition would be the non-critical 
color (the alternative), and for the polychotomous condition, the “most likely” color would 
be the critical color (the focal).  This may help better illustrate the alternative outcomes effect 
and how it can affect not only prediction strategy, but subsequent accuracy.   
 When considering the optimal decision making results of this study, it may seem 
intuitive that a strong desirability bias would automatically indicate an equally strong 
decrease in accuracy.  However, bias by itself does not always lead to worse decision making.  
If a participant was guessing throughout the task, there would be low levels of both bias and 
accuracy.  Conversely, it is possible to be biased but just as accurate.  For example, imagine 
someone predicting the results of a coin flip.  If he or she predicts heads every time, that 
would indicate a bias, but would not necessarily affect accuracy.   This is not what my study 
showed, however.  My study showed that biased decision making is also related to poorer 
decision making (illustrated through the negative correlation between optimal decision 
making and wishful thinking).  The stakes of this paradigm remained relatively low, but the 
implications of trading good decision making for preference can have consequences ranging 
from disappointing (losing a bet) to deadly (a doctor choosing a treatment based on 
subjective preference for that treatment).  The exploratory measure of numeracy may 
possibly explain this inability to make unbiased decisions.  The negative relationship 
between numeracy and wishful thinking means that those who are highly numerate tend to be 
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less biased.  This may be because participants who understand probabilities can rely on the 
numeric information to make decisions, and those who have a difficult time with numeric 
reasoning may rely on alternative factors (e.g., intuitive preference for an outcome).  An 
interesting next step would be to help improve the numeracy of those making predictions 
about visual and/or numeric probabilities.  This may help to establish a causal link and 
determine if there are ways to actively debias people.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of this study is the artificial nature of the study.  This paradigm was 
not asking people to predict the outcome of an election (i.e., a real-world task), but instead 
had participants predicting which square from a grid that a computer would pick at random. 
That said, the paradigm used allowed me to run a tightly controlled study.  In other words, I 
traded external validity for internal validity.   
One benefit of the paradigm was that I could control for factors other than desirability 
that might influence people’s decisions.  For example, when making a prediction about an 
upcoming sports game involving a preferred team, the decision-maker is not only necessarily 
concerned with accuracy.  Predicting a preferred team to win can be the product of multiple 
factors, including loyalty, team location, rivalries, or identification as fan.  Most of the time, 
people are unwilling to bet against a preferred team (Morewedge et al., 2018).  While a real-
world example would have been less artificial, it was my goal in this study to isolate the 
influence of desire, outcome likelihood, and the number of outcomes, something that would 
be impossible in a real-world prediction task.  Furthermore, it would be impossible to 
randomly assign desire in a real-world task (e.g., it would be impossible to randomly assign 
half the participants to hope Donald Trump is reelected to the presidency and the other half 
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assigned to hope Trump is not reelected).  That said, a future demonstration could remedy 
this issue by using a slightly more real-world application, but in a context where the 
uncertainty could be controlled.  For example, using a task like the raffle studies that were 
used in the alternative outcomes research (Windschitl & Wells, 1998).   
Another limitation is that this study used one specific method of displaying the 
likelihood of the outcomes.  There are a variety of ways to represent probabilities and 
uncertainty, ranging from probabilistic and precise (e.g., 40%), to unorganized, visual, and 
ambiguous (e.g., a scrambled grid of colors representing 40%).  Because of the different 
ways of representing uncertainty, and the moderate correlation between numeracy and 
wishful thinking, it may be beneficial to explore if other representations of numerical 
likelihoods would yield an effect where mine did not. 
Conclusion 
This was the first study to demonstrate that the typical wishful thinking effect found 
in dichotomous predictions stays true for polychotomous predictions.  Although a significant 
bias was detected, it is fortunate that this bias was not exacerbated by the number of 
outcomes.  The results of this thesis indicate that decision strategy may be more a product of 
the task and structure of the outcomes, rather than trial by trial situational motivation.  It 
seems as though how people make decisions (e.g., likelihood or pairwise) may be less 
flexible than originally hypothesized, for better or for worse.   
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and relationships among participant characteristics. 
 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; WT index coded on a -1 – 1 scale; Optimal Index 
coded on a 0 – 1 scale; Numeracy coded on a 0 – 8 scale; Optimism, Rational Ability, 
Rational Engagement, Experiential Ability, and Experiential Engagement coded on a 1-5 
point scale; All values are r-values. For values listed for a relationship with gender, positive 
correlations indicate higher levels for females, and negative correlations indicate higher 
levels for males.  
  
 Mean (SD) Optimal Index Numeracy Optimism 
Rational 
Ability 
Rational 
Engagement 
Experiential 
Ability 
Experiential 
Engagement Age Gender 
WT Index 0.25(0.31) -.374** -.133* .008 .035 -.02 .144* .103 -.07 -.069 
Optimal 
Index 0.76(0.17) - .219** -.038 .043 .106 .014 -.062 .064 -.067 
Numeracy 3.31(1.59)  - .085 .233** .219** -.02 -.072 -.044 -.157* 
Optimism 3.10(0.83)   - .260** .115 .305** .111 .029 .009 
Rational 
Ability 4.50(0.58)    - .571** .198** -.041 -.101 .001 
Rational 
Engagement 4.43(0.58)     - .065 .009 .005 -.099 
Experiential 
Ability 4.23(0.58)      - .575** -.033 .062 
Experiential 
Engagement 4.54(0.52)       - -.049 .139* 
Age 19.19(1.43)        - -.055 
Gender 86% females 13% males         - 
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Figure 1.  A side-by-side comparison of the dichotomous outcome condition (left) and the 
polychotomous outcome condition (right).  In this trial, the percentage of the critical color is 
50%, and the critical color is desirable because it is associated with winning points.  The 
participants used this information to make a prediction on the next screen. 
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Figure 2.  The top pictures shows the outcome prediction that participants in the dichotomous 
condition made.  The bottom pictures shows the outcome prediction that participants in the 
polychotomous condition made.  This information was available until the participants made a 
prediction. 
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Figure 3.  The number of trials where participants predicted the critical color across the two 
outcome conditions.   
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Figure 4.  The percentage of trials where participants predicted the critical color across the 
different percentage conditions for each of the desirability and outcome conditions. 
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Figure 5.  The percentage of trials where participants predicted the optimal color across the 
different percentage conditions for each of the desirability and outcome conditions. 
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Figure 6.  A back-to-back graphic of the different percentages conditions. The top row 
consists of the grids from the dichotomous condition and the bottom row consists of the grids 
from the polychotomous condition. From left to right, the percentage condition is: 25%, 40%, 
50%, 60%, and 75%. 
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Appendix A 
To: Cassandra Smith 
Psychology 
CAMPUS EMAIL 
 
From: Monica Molina, IRB Associate Administrator 
Date: 4/05/2018 
RE: Notice of IRB Exemption 
 
STUDY #: 18-0234 
STUDY TITLE: Making Predictions 
 
Exemption Category: (2) Anonymous Educational Tests; Surveys, Interviews or Observations 
  
This study involves minimal risk and meets the exemption category cited above. In accordance with 
45 CFR 46.101(b) and University policy and procedures, the research activities described in the study 
materials are exempt from further IRB review. 
 
All approved documents for this study, including consent forms, can be accessed by logging into 
IRBIS. Use the following directions to access approved study documents.  
1. Log into IRBIS 
2. Click "Home" on the top toolbar 
3. Click "My Studies" under the heading "All My Studies" 
4. Click on the IRB number for the study you wish to access 
5. Click on the reference ID for your submission 
6. Click "Attachments" on the left-hand side toolbar 
7. Click on the appropriate documents you wish to download 
 
Study Change:  Proposed changes to the study require further IRB review when the change involves: 
• an external funding source, 
• the potential for a conflict of interest, 
• a change in location of the research (i.e., country, school system, off site location), 
• the contact information for the Principal Investigator, 
• the addition of non-Appalachian State University faculty, staff, or students to the research team, 
or 
• the basis for the determination of exemption. Standard Operating Procedure #9 cites examples of 
changes which affect the basis of the determination of exemption on page 3. 
 
Investigator Responsibilities:  All individuals engaged in research with human participants are 
responsible for compliance with University policies and procedures, and IRB determinations. The 
Principal Investigator (PI), or Faculty Advisor if the PI is a student, is ultimately responsible for 
ensuring the protection of research participants; conducting sound ethical research that complies with 
federal regulations, University policy and procedures; and maintaining study records. The PI should 
review the IRB's list of PI responsibilities. 
 
To Close the Study:  When research procedures with human participants are completed, please send 
the Request for Closure of IRB Review form to irb@appstate.edu. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact the Research Protections Office at (828) 262-2692.  
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Appendix B 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Making Predictions 
Principal Investigator: Cassandra L.  Smith - smithcl13@appstate.edu 
Faculty Advisor: Andrew R.  Smith – smithar3@appstate.edu 
Department: Psychology 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about how people make decisions.   If you take 
part in this study, you were one of about 600 people to do so.   By doing this study we hope to learn 
how people make decisions about uncertain events.  In this study, you were asked to complete a task 
where you can make different types of predictions.   Also, you were asked questions about your 
personality, age, and gender.  Participation will take no more than 30 minutes. 
 
Unfortunately, you cannot volunteer for this study if are under 18 years of age.  To the best of our 
knowledge, the risk of harm for participating in this research study is no more than you would 
experience in everyday life.   Your identity cannot be connected to your data.   Therefore, all of your 
responses in this study will remain confidential.   There may be no personal benefit from your 
participation but the information gained by doing this research will help us understand factors that 
influence people’s decisions.  In turn, this may help us design practices to improve people’s decision 
making.    
 
You will not be paid for your time, but your participation in this study you will earn you 1 ELC via 
the SONA system.  Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.   You can decide to stop 
at any time for any reason and you many skip any question you would prefer not to answer.   You will 
receive no penalty for stopping this study early.   In order to fulfill your ELC requirement, there are 
research and non-research alternatives to participating in this study.  For example, one non-research 
option is to read an article and write a 1-2 page paper summarizing the article and your reaction to it.  
This would be worth 1 ELC.  Additionally, there are other studies you may participate in to meet this 
requirement.   More information about this option can be found at: psych.appstate.edu/research.   You 
may also wish to consult your professor to see if other non-research options are available. 
 
The people conducting this study were available to answer any questions concerning this research, 
now or in the future.   You may contact the Principal Investigator at 828-262-2272 or 
smithcl13@appstate.edu.  You may also contact the faculty advisor at smithar3@appstate.edu.  If you 
have questions about your rights as someone taking part in research, contact the Appalachian 
Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2692 (days), through email at irb@appstate.edu 
or at Appalachian State University, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB Administrator, 
Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Appalachian State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) has determined this study to be 
exempt from IRB oversight. 
 
By continuing to the survey, I acknowledge that I am at least 18 years old, have read the above 
information, and provide my consent to participate under the terms above. 
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Appendix C 
Life Orientation Test (LOT)—Revised 
Please be as honest and accurate as you can throughout.   Try not to let your response to one 
statement influence your responses to other statements.   There are no "correct" or "incorrect" 
answers.   Answer according to your own feelings, rather than how you think "most people" 
would answer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.   _____________ 
 
2. It's easy for me to relax.      _____________ 
 
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will.   _____________ 
 
4. I'm always optimistic about my future.    _____________ 
 
5. I enjoy my friends a lot.      _____________ 
 
6. It's important for me to keep busy.    _____________ 
 
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.   _____________ 
 
8. I don't get upset too easily.     _____________ 
 
9. I rarely count on good things happening to me.   _____________ 
 
10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. _____________ 
 
 
  
  1           2                3   4   5 
I disagree a lot I disagree a little     I neither agree nor disagree      I agree a little        I agree a lot 
DESIRABILITY BIAS AND ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES 49 
 
 
 
Appendix D 
 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI)—40 
 
Test Format: The items are rated using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not true of 
myself) to 5 (definitely true of myself). 
 
Items 
 
Rationality scale 
I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.  (re‒) 
I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems.  (ra‒) 
I enjoy intellectual challenges.  (re) 
I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.  (ra‒) 
I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.  (re‒) 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.  (re) 
Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.  (re‒) 
I am not a very analytical thinker.  (ra‒) 
Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.  (ra‒) 
I prefer complex problems to simple problems.  (re) 
Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.  (re‒) 
I don’t reason well under pressure.  (ra‒) 
I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.  (ra) 
I have a logical mind.  (ra) 
I enjoy thinking in abstract term.  (re) 
I have no problem thinking things through carefully.  (ra) 
Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.  (ra) 
Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for 
me.  (re‒) 
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.  (ra) 
Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.  (re) 
 
Experientiality scale 
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.  (ee) 
I don’t have a very good sense of intuition.  (ea‒) 
Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.  (ea) 
I believe in trusting my hunches.  (ea) 
Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.  (ee) 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.  (ee) 
I trust my initial feelings about people.  (ea) 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.  (ea) 
If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.  (ea‒) 
I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.  (ee‒) 
I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.  (ee) 
I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.  (ee‒) 
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions.  (ee‒) 
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I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.  (ee‒) 
I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.  (ea) 
I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.  (ee‒) 
My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s.  (ea‒) 
I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.  (ee) 
I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know.  (ea) 
I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.  (ea‒) 
 
 
Note.   The name of the subscale to which each item belongs appears in parentheses, ee = 
Experiential Engagement; ea = Experiential Ability; re = Rational Engagement; ra = Rational 
Ability.   A minus sign (—) with a scale name denotes reverse scoring. 
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Appendix E 
1.  Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times.  Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times 
do you think the die would come up as an even number? 
Answer: 500 
  
2.  In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%.  What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a 
single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
Answer: 10 people 
  
3.  In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.  
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
Answer: .10% 
  
4.  If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 1000? 
Answer: 100 people 
  
5.  If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 20% 
chance of getting the disease. 
  
6.  Suppose your friend just had a mammogram.  The doctor knows from previous studies 
that, of 100 women like her, 10 have tumors and 90 do not.  Of the 10 who do have tumors, 
the mammogram correctly finds 9 with tumors and incorrectly says that 1 does not have a 
tumor.  Of the 90 women without tumors, the mammogram correctly finds 80 without tumors 
and incorrectly says that 10 have tumors.  The table below summarizes this information.  
Imagine that your friend tests positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that she 
actually has a tumor? 
  Tested Positive Tested Negative Totals 
Actually has a tumor 9 1 10 
Does not have a tumor 10 80 90 
Totals 19 81 100 
  
Answer: 9 out of 19 
  
7.  A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.  How much 
does the ball cost?  
Answer: 5 cents 
  
8.  In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size.  If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half 
of the lake? 
Answer: 47 days 
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Footnotes 
1 In addition, ninety-six different participants were asked to provided certainty estimates on 
an 11-point numerical measure of certainty (i.e., 0% - 100%).  The results of the analyses 
using the two different outcome measures yielded the same conclusion. 
2 I decided on this distribution, as opposed to the commonly used 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 
70% (for a review, see Krizan and Windschitl, 2007).  This experiment will manipulate 
dichotomous versus polychotomous by changing the number of each of the colors on the 
300-square grid.  I needed frequencies that could be divided evenly by two for the 
dichotomous condition, and frequencies that could be further divided by three for the three 
non-critical colors in the polychotomous condition. 
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